A platform organizations trust with sensitive security data
The platform is a multi-tenant enterprise security product. Organizations use it to centralize, analyze, and act on security information, with separate tenants, user roles, and administrative functions. Because customers rely on it to keep their data isolated and its controls enforced, authorization is the most consequential thing it has to get right.
In a multi-tenant product, authorization is the trust boundary
Two questions decide whether a multi-tenant platform can be trusted. Can a user in one tenant reach another tenant's data? Can a lower-privilege user call functions reserved for higher-privilege roles? Neither shows up as a crash or an error. They only surface when roles, functions, and objects are tested systematically.
Every tenant, every role, every function
Map the app
Agents learn the app the way an attacker would, discovering its functions, workflows, and object types.
Assume every role
Testing runs as users in different tenants and at different privilege levels.
Test every combination
Each role is tried against each function and object, including cross-tenant requests.
Prove and report
Findings are confirmed by the agents before they are reported.
Systemic gaps in function-level and object-level authorization
Every finding below is an access-control failure: something a user could do or reach that their tenant and role should not allow.
Cross-tenant access
Critical · 2A user in one tenant could read data belonging to another tenant, breaking the isolation that multi-tenant customers depend on.
Function-level authorization (BFLA)
High · 34Standard tenant users could call functions reserved for higher-privilege roles, including administrative and configuration functions (such as identity and integration settings) and some that create or modify records.
Object-level access weaknesses
High · 68Predictable object identifiers across many resource types made records enumerable by an authenticated user, an object-level authorization weakness.
The cost of finding them late
Each of these is the kind of issue that would be paid out under a bug-bounty program if reported externally. Finding them through structured testing avoids that cost, and the exposure behind it.
Estimate, not a measured outcome.
Takeaway: tenant isolation has to be tested, not assumed
For a multi-tenant security product, isolation between tenants and separation between roles are promises made to every customer. Testing every role against every function and object is how those promises get verified.
Find what your last pentest missed.
Autonomous agents that learn your app, prove the exploit, and ship the fix. No source code required.
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